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Abstract
We study optimal monetary policy in two prototype economies with sticky prices and credit
market frictions. In the ﬁrst economy, credit frictions apply to the ﬁnancing of the capital stock,
generate acceleration in response to shocks and the ”ﬁnancial markup” (i.e., the premium on
external funds) is countercyclical and negatively correlated with the asset price. In the second
economy, credit frictions apply to the ﬂow of investment, generate persistence, and the ﬁnancial
markup is procyclical and positively correlated with the asset price. We model monetary policy
in terms of welfare-maximizing interest rate rules. The main ﬁnding of our analysis is that strict
inﬂation stabilization is a robust optimal monetary policy prescription. The intuition is that, in
both models, credit frictions work in the direction of dampening the cyclical behavior of inﬂation
relative to its credit-frictionless level. Thus neither economy, despite yielding diﬀerent inﬂation
and investment dynamics, generates a trade-oﬀ between price and ﬁnancial markup stabilization.
A corollary of this result is that reacting to asset prices does not bear any independent welfare
role in the conduct of monetary policy.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper we study optimal monetary policy rules in an economy with nominal rigidities and
credit market imperfections. Our interest is twofold. First, we aim at driving the attention of
the recent literature on a typology of market distortions whose role has been largely neglected in
the normative analysis of monetary policy. This is surprising, considering the increasing emphasis
placed on ﬁnancial factors in the studying of business cycles (starting with Bernanke and Gertler
(1989)). Second, we aim at assessing - from a welfare-based perspective - the role that asset prices
and or other ﬁnancial indicators should play in the optimal setting of monetary policy rules.
The latter issue has been recently the object of an intense debate, within both policy and
academic circles, in light of the asset price inﬂation phenomenon of the late nineties, followed
by the burst of the alleged ﬁnancial bubble at the beginning of the new century.1 However, the
theoretical literature linking asset prices, monetary policy and ﬁnancial frictions in dynamic general
equilibrium models has been scant. Bernanke and Gertler (2001) (BG henceforth) compare the
performance of alternative interest rate rules, including some that feature a reaction to asset price
movements. Their main conclusion is that there is negligible stabilization gain from including asset
prices as independent arguments in the rules. Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) employ a similar (ﬁnancial
accelerator) framework, and evaluate the ability of alternative rules to have their reference model
mimic as close as possible the dynamics of a real business cycle model. Cecchetti et al. (2002)
contend with BG, and argue that the desirability of including asset prices as separate arguments
in interest rate rules is likely to depend on the underlying source of shocks.2
The common shortcoming of this literature is that it completely abstracts from strict welfare
considerations. The metric adopted for the evaluation of the relative performance of policy rules
is typically an output-inﬂation volatility frontier. This makes it hard to correctly rank alternative
speciﬁcations for monetary policy, and to safely draw normative conclusions about the desirability
for monetary policy to react to asset price movements. It is this consideration that essentially
motivates the present paper.
A common argument of the contenders of the BG view is that asset price movements may be
driven by non-fundamental shocks to the ﬁnancial side of the economy - i.e., bubbles - and that a
monetary authority which aims at reaching a ﬁrst-best allocation should convey those movements
back to their eﬃcient evolution.3 However, it seems hard to justify a systematic response of
the monetary authority to asset price movements only on the possibility of occurrence of bubble
1See Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) for a survey.
2Iacoviello (2004) analyzes monetary policy in a model with credit cycles a la Kyotaki and Moore (1997) and
housing, and concludes that reacting to asset prices does not improve macroeconomic stability.
3See also Dupor (2003).
1dynamics (Bernanke 2002). For this reason we re-focus the analysis in a more genuine public ﬁnance
spirit and solely in the presence of fundamental shocks (e.g., to productivity and/or government
expenditures).
Our baseline economy will feature three types of distortions. First, monopolistic competition
in goods markets, which forces average output below the socially optimal level. Second, adjustment
c o s t si nn o m i n a lg o o d sp r i c e s ,w h i c he n t a i lad i r e c tr e s o u r c ec o s t ,a sw e l la sam i s a l i g n m e n tb e t w e e n
the marginal utility of consumption and leisure due to time variations in price markups. Third,
informational frictions, in the form of endogenous agency costs, which characterize the relationship
between borrowers and lenders in the credit market. In this context, and in deviation from the
Modigliani-Miller theorem, the evolution of ﬁrms’ net worth aﬀects both the cost of access to credit
and the price of capital. Yet, in turn, these developments feedback onto ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial position,
further aﬀecting investment and capital accumulation. Agency costs, per se, have a twofold eﬀect.
In the long run, they produce an ineﬃciently low level of capital, and hence output, since the
economy suﬀers a deadweight loss associated to the monitoring activity of the lender. In the short-
run, the presence of a time-varying ”ﬁnancial markup” distorts the dynamic allocation of capital
and investment.
The recent optimal monetary policy literature has dealt with the role of distortions in alterna-
tive ways. The vast majority of papers specify a complementary (and arguably unrealistic) role of
ﬁscal policy to neutralize the steady-state distortions related to market power in goods and/or labor
markets. This assures that, if the only left distortion is price stickiness, the average level of output
coincides (under zero inﬂation) also with the eﬃcient one, allowing to neglect the role of stochastic
uncertainty on the mean level of those variables which are relevant for welfare.4 The approach
followed here, as in Kollmann (2003a, 2003b) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003, 2004b), and
unlike much of the so-called New Keynesian literature, allows to study optimal policy in a dynamic
economy that evolves around a steady-state which remains distorted. Importantly, in our context,
the steady state of the economy will be distorted not only by the presence of nominal rigidities and
market power in goods markets, but also by the presence of monitoring costs in credit markets. As
emphasized by Kim et al. (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b), this strategy requires that
an accurate evaluation of welfare be based on a higher order approximation of all the conditions
that characterize the competitive equilibrium of the economy.5
4To name a few, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), King and Wolman (1999),
E r c e g ,H e n d e r s o na n dL e v i n( 2 0 0 0 ) ,culminating with Woodford (2003).
5Alternatively, Benigno and Woodford (2004) show how to preserve the linear-quadratic form of an optimal policy
problem in the case in which the economy ﬂuctuates around a non-eﬃcient steady-state. This per se requires taking
a second order approximation of (some of) the underlying equilibrium conditions.
21.1 Credit Frictions and Financial Markups: Two Theoretical Frameworks
We will articulate our analysis of optimal monetary policy on two general equilibrium models in
which credit market frictions and asset price movements play a role. The ﬁrst model is based
on Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), while the second model is a sticky-price monetary
extension of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). The common denominator to the two models is that
credit frictions take the form of endogenous agency costs in the relationship between lenders and
borrowers (typically entrepreneurs). These costs emerge when verifying the return of borrowers’
(risky) projects is costly for the lender, a feature that generates a typical moral hazard problem.6
There are however important diﬀerences. In the ﬁrst framework, labelled below as capital-
acceleration model (KA model henceforth), credit frictions apply to the ﬁnancing of the stock of
capital owned by entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, ﬁrms face a spread between the cost of internal
and external funds (the external ﬁnance premium). The key element of this model lies in the coun-
tercyclical behavior of the ﬁnance premium, a mechanism that generates an eﬀect of acceleration
in response to shocks. Movements in asset prices act to reinforce this mechanism, by aﬀecting the
value of the capital stock and hence entrepreneurs’ balance sheets. This asset price eﬀect is akin to
the credit-cycle phenomenon stressed by Kyotaki and Moore (1997). The main regularity we are
interested in singling out in this model is that, as a result, asset prices and ﬁnance premium are
negatively correlated.
The second model we analyze is labelled investment-propagation model (IP henceforth). In
this framework, credit frictions apply to the ﬁnancing of the investment ﬂow.T w o a r e t h e m a i n
diﬀerences with respect to the KA model. First, rather than acceleration, the IP model generates
equilibrium propagation of shocks (i.e., hump-shaped dynamics of output and investment). This
diﬀerence stems crucially from the equilibrium sluggish behavior of entrepreneurs’ net worth. This
feature is such that, e.g., a rise in productivity, brings about an initial rise in borrowing needs
and therefore in the marginal cost of investment. However, as net worth accumulates over time,
it generates a corresponding shift in the investment supply curve, thereby subsequently lowering
the marginal cost of investment. This eﬀect generates a second crucial diﬀerence in the IP model,
namely that the external ﬁnance premium behaves procyclically, and is directly proportional to
the behavior of the relative price of investment goods (asset price). Thus, asset price and ﬁnance
premium are positively correlated in this framework.
An important consequence is that the interpretation of asset price movements diﬀers in the
two models. In the KA model, ﬂuctuations in asset prices are introduced somewhat exogenously.
More precisely, they would disappear in the absence of adjustment costs on capital (a scenario that
6In turn, all these models are extensions of the seminal contribution of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) who incor-
porate in general equilibrium the costly state veriﬁcation framework of Gale and Hellwig (1985).
3would not correspond to the absence of credit frictions)7. Rather, in the IP model, movements in
the Tobin’s q are genuinely endogenous, in the sense that they relate fundamentally to the presence
of investment ﬁnancing frictions.
Therefore, and more importantly for our purposes, the public ﬁnance interpretation of asset
price movements diﬀers in the two models. In the IP model, unlike the KA model, asset price
ﬂuctuations are akin to ﬁnancial markups cyclical variations. In fact, investment goods must sell
at a markup over consumption goods to compensate the lender for the costs of imperfect monitoring.
In this respect, their behavior resembles the one of a tax aﬀecting the intertemporal allocation of
investment. The corresponding ﬁnancial markup concept in the KA model is the external ﬁnance
premium on the amount borrowed in excess of internal funds. In equilibrium, capital accumulation
must be such that the marginal cost of external funds is equated to the rate of return on capital.
Hence, in this case, a markup is applied to a relative return as opposed to a relative price.
The main ﬁnding of our analysis is that strict inﬂation stabilization is a robust optimal mon-
etary policy prescription. Noticeably, this holds regardless of the two models delivering opposite
predictions on the cyclical behavior of the ﬁnancial markup. The basic intuition works as follows.
Although the dynamics of inﬂation and investment diﬀer sharply across models, we ﬁnd that in
both cases credit frictions work in the direction of dampening the cyclical behavior of inﬂation
relative to a hypothetical environment in which the same frictions are absent. Hence, when credit
frictions generate acceleration and over-investment (as in the KA model) we ﬁnd that inﬂation
falls below its steady state but, at the margin, it rises relative to its level in the absence of credit
frictions. On the other hand, when credit frictions generate persistence and, in the short run,
keep investment below its credit-frictionless level (as in the IP model), also inﬂation remains below
its credit-frictionless benchmark. In both cases, a manipulation of the real interest rate does not
generate any inherent trade-oﬀ between stabilizing the price markup and stabilizing the ﬁnancial
markup. A corollary of this result is that reacting to asset prices does not bear any independent
welfare role in the conduct of monetary policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 6 introduces the main
diﬀerences in the theoretical frameworks analyzed in the paper. Section 3 describes our calibration
and solution strategy. Section 4 presents results on the equilibrium dynamics.. Section 5 illustrates
our welfare metric and section 7 concludes.
7This does not deny of course that movements in asset prices are magniﬁe di nt h eK Am o d e ld u et oa ne n d o g e n o u s
interaction with ﬁrms’ balance sheets.
42 Capital-Acceleration (KA) Model
The ﬁrst model we analyze builds on Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) ﬁnancial accelerator
model. We will present this framework in more detail, while later on emphasizing only the basic
diﬀerences in the IP model.8
2.1 Households (Lenders)
There is a continuum of households, each indexed by i ∈ (0,1). They consume a composite ﬁnal
good, invest in safe bank deposits, supply labor, and own shares of a monopolistic competitive
sector that produces diﬀerentiated varieties of goods. The representative household chooses the
set of processes {Ct,N t}∞
t=0 and one-period nominal deposits {Dt}∞
t=0, taking as given the set of
processes {Pt,W t, (1 + Rn
t )}∞








subject to the sequence of budget constraints:
PtCt + Dt+1 ≤ (1 + Rn
t )Dt + WtNt + Υt + Tt (2)
where Ct is workers’ consumption of the ﬁnal good, Wt is the nominal wage, Nt is total labor hours,
Rn
t is the nominal net interest rate paid on deposits, Υt are the nominal proﬁts that households
receive from running production in the monopolistic sector and Tt are lump sum taxes/transfers
from the ﬁscal authority. The ﬁrst order conditions of the above problem read as follows:















t+j)−1Dt+j =0 ( 5 )
with the addition of (2) holding with equality.
8An alternative to the KA framework, still featuring eﬀects of ﬁnancial acceleration (or ”credit cycles”), would
have been the model of Kyotaki and Moore (1997). See below for a discussion of why the latter model would have
been incongrous for the analysis of optimal policy conducted here.
52.2 Unﬁnished-Capital Producers
A competitive sector of capital producers combine investment (expressed in the same composite as
the ﬁn a lg o o d ,h e n c ew i t hp r i c ePt) and existing (depreciated) capital stock to produce unﬁnished
capital goods. This activity entails physical adjustment costs. The corresponding CRS production
function is φ( It
Kt) Kt, so that capital accumulation obeys:




where φ(•) is increasing and convex.
Deﬁne Qt as the re-sell price of the capital good. Capital producers maximize proﬁts Qt φ( It
Kt)








The activity of the second set of agents, the entrepreneurs, is at the heart of the model. These
agents are risk neutral. They purchase unﬁnished capital from the capital producers at the price
Qt and transform it into ﬁnished capital to be rented to intermediated goods producers. To ﬁnance
the purchase of unﬁnished capital they employ internal funds but need also to acquire an external
loan from a ﬁnancial intermediary. The relationship with the lender is subject to an agency cost
problem, which forces the entrepreneur to pay a premium on the loan. We will elaborate below on
this point.
We assume that the entrepreneurs are ﬁnitely lived (with θ being the probability of dying in
each period ) and risk neutral. This assumption assures that entrepreneurial consumption occurs
to such an extent that self-ﬁnancing never occurs and borrowing constraints on loans are always
binding. Resorting to the law of large numbers and to the characteristics of the loan contract will
allow a convenient aggregation for these agents’ decisions. As consumers, the entrepreneurs act as
simple ﬁnitely lived agents who in every period consume a constant share of their wealth.
Let’s deﬁne by Zt the nominal rental rate of capital. The nominal income from holding
one unit of ﬁnished capital is composed of the rental rate plus the re-sell price of capital (net of
depreciation and physical adjustment costs):
Yk
t ≡ Zt + Qt
µ




















2.4 The Loan Contract Between the Borrower and the Financial Intermediary
At the e n do fp e r i o dta continuum of entrepreneurs (indexed by j) need to ﬁnance the purchase
of new capital K
j
t+1 that will be used for production in period t + 1. In order to acquire a loan
the entrepreneurs have to engage in a ﬁnancial contract before the realization of an idiosyncratic
shock ω(j)( w i t hap a y o ﬀ paid after the realization of the same shock). The idiosyncratic shock
has positive support, is independently distributed (across entrepreneurs and time) with a uniform
distribution, F(ω), with unitary mean, and density function f(ω). The return of the entrepreneurial




where µ is the fraction of lender’s output lost in monitoring costs. Hence this cost is proportional
to the expected return on capital purchased at the end of period t .
Before entering the loan contract agreement each entrepreneur owns end-of-period internal
funds for a nominal amount NW
j
t+1 and seeks to ﬁnance the purchase of new capital QtK
j
t+1.W e
assume that the required funds for investment exceed internal funds. Hence in every period each







t+1 ≥ 0( 9 )
The ﬁnancial contract assumes the form of an optimal debt contract ` al aG a l ea n dH e l l w i g
(1985). When the idiosyncratic shock to capital investment is above the cut-oﬀ value which deter-
mines the default states the entrepreneurs repay a ﬁxed amount (1 + RL
t+1). On the contrary, in
the default states, the bank monitors the investment activity and repossesses the assets of the ﬁrm.
Default occurs when the return from the investment activity Yk
t+1K
j
t+1 falls short of the amount
that needs to be repaid (1+RL
t+1)L
j
t+1. Hence the default space is implicitly deﬁned as that range

















t+1 is a cut-oﬀ value for the idiosyncratic productivity shock, which is determined endoge-
nously in the general equilibrium9.
The timing of events can be summarized as follows
• End of period t.
9The fact that default is an equilibrium phenomenon is a crucial diﬀerence between the endogenous agency cost
models (as the ones employed here) and the credit-cycle models a la Kyotaki and Moore (1997).
71. Entrepreneur j holds nominal net worth NW
j
t+1, acquires loan L
j
t+1 to purchase new capital
K
j
t+1 which will be available to rental market and production in period t +1 .
2. Idiosyncratic shock ω
j
t+1 to the newly purchased capital realizes.
• Period t +1 .
1. Aggregate shocks to productivity and government consumption realize.
2. Entrepreneur supplies capital services to rental market.
3. Entrepreneur pays oﬀ loan services to the lender.
4. Current net worth realizes.
2.5 Optimal Contract
Let’s deﬁne by Γ( j)a n d1−Γ( j) the fractions of net capital output received by the lender and































t+1). The return paid on deposits is
given by the safe rate (1 +Rn
t ), which as such corresponds, for the lender, to the opportunity cost
of ﬁnancing capital.
The participation constraint for the lender states that the expected return from the lending
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which solves the following maximization problem:






subject to the participation constraint (11). Let χt be the lagrange multiplier on (11). First order

















(1 − Γ( 
j
t+1)) + χt(Γ( 
j





In addition, with χt > 0, (11) must hold with equality.
2.5.1 Counter-cyclical Premium on External Finance
Combining (13) and (14) yields a linear relationship between capital demand and net worth. This
linearity of the optimal contract allows easy aggregation. This yields the following relation between











(1 − Γ( t+1))(Γ
0





+( Γ( t+1) − µM( t+1))
#−1
(15)
with ρ0( ) > 0.







as the premium on external ﬁnance. This ratio captures the
diﬀerence between the cost of ﬁnance reﬂecting the existence of monitoring costs, and the safe
interest rate (which per se reﬂects the opportunity cost for the lender). By combining (11) with
(15) one can write a relationship between capital expenditure QtKt+1 and net worth NWt+1 whose




1 − ψt(Γ( t+1) − µM( t+1))
¶
NWt+1 (16)
Equation (16) is a key relationship in this context, for it explicitly shows the link between
capital expenditure and entrepreneurs’ ﬁnancial conditions (summarized by aggregate net worth).
One can view (16) as a demand equation, in which the demand of capital depends inversely on the
price and positively on the aggregate ﬁnancial conditions.
On the other hand, one can write the ﬁnance premium ψt as:







9where h( t+1) ≡ [Γ( t+1) − µM( t+1)]
−1. One can easily show that h
0
(•) > 0. This expression
suggests that the external ﬁnance premium is an equilibrium inverse function of the aggregate
ﬁnancial conditions in the economy, expressed by the (inverse) leverage ratio
NWt+1
QtKt+1.
The countercyclical behavior of the ﬁnance premium and the related acceleration phenomenon
stems from two eﬀects. Consider a productivity boom, which raises the current and expected future
marginal product of capital. This raises the asset price Qt. Notice that this link would disappear
in the absence of adjustment costs on capital, which are the only source of endogeneity of asset
prices. Since capital is basically ﬁxed in the short run, a rise in the asset price competes with a
rise in net worth in driving the behavior of borrowing needs (see equation (9)). Holding net worth
constant, the rise in the asset price drives borrowing needs upward. However, the rise in the asset
price stimulates net worth more than proportionally, thereby driving borrowing needs downward,
and generating a countercyclical response of the ﬁnance premium via two eﬀects in equation (17):
a fall in the default threshold  t+1 (and therefore a fall in h( t+1)) and a rise in the ratio
NWt+1
QtKt+1.
2.5.2 Net Worth Accumulation
Aggregate net worth at the end of period t is proportional to the realization of capital income:
NWt+1 = θ(1 − Γ( t+1))Yk
t Kt (18)
By lagging (11) one period and combining with (18) one can describe the evolution between
period t and t + 1 of aggregate nominal net worth as











Equation (19) illustrates the ambiguous role that movements in Rk
t exert on the accumulation of
net worth. On the one hand, a rise in Rk
t signals a higher return to any owned unit of capital in
period t, and therefore tends to rise net worth. On the other hand, in equilibrium, a higher Rk
t
also corresponds (ceteris paribus) to a higher cost of external ﬁnance, and therefore contributes
to the risk premium factor
µM( t)(1+Rk
t )Qt−1Kt
Qt−1Kt−NWt that augments the nominal safe return on deposits
(1 + Rn
t ), thereby reducing net worth. In equilibrium, capital accumulation must be such that the
rate of return on capital equates the marginal cost of ﬁnance.
Finally, entrepreneurs’ consumption is given by a constant share of capital income:
Ce
t =( 1− θ)(1 − Γ( t+1))Yk
t Kt (20)
102.6 Production and Pricing of Intermediate Goods
Each domestic household owns an equal share of the intermediate-goods producing ﬁrms.10 Each
ﬁrm assembles labor (supplied by the workers) and (ﬁnished) entrepreneurial capital to operate a
constant return to scale production function for the variety i o ft h ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d :
Yt(i)=AtF(Nt(i),K t(i)) (21)
where At is a productivity shifter common to all entrepreneurs. Each ﬁrm i has monopolistic power
in the production of its own variety and therefore has leverage in setting the price. In so doing







,w h e r eπ is the steady-state inﬂation rate and
where the parameter ωp measures the degree of nominal price rigidity.11 The higher ωp the more
sluggish is the adjustment of nominal prices. In the particular case of ωp = 0, prices are ﬂexible.
The problem of each domestic monopolistic ﬁrm is the one of choosing the sequence {Kt(i),N t(i),P t(i)}
∞
t=0

















subject to the constraint AtF(.) ≥ Yt(i). Let’s denote by {mct}
∞
t=0 the sequence of lagrange multi-
pliers on the above demand constraint, and by e pt ≡
Pt(i)
Pt the relative price of variety i.T h eﬁrst




























10An alternative ownership structure could be explored, in which the entrepreneurs directly own the shares of the
intermediate goods ﬁrms that employ capital in production. In this case monopolistic proﬁts would be part of capital
income Y
k
t , as in Cook (2002).
11Recall that, in our framework, π>0. An alternative formulation may feature adjustment costs penalizing the
deviation of the rate of change of prices from the past inﬂation rate πt−1. However, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b)
show that the latter formulation (similar to the one employed in Christiano et al. (2003)) biases the optimal policy
towards generating an inﬂation volatility signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
11where πt ≡ Pt
Pt−1is the gross inﬂation rate, and where we have suppressed the superscript i, since
all ﬁrms employ an identical capital/labor ratio in equilibrium. Notice that the lagrange multiplier
mct plays the role of the real marginal cost of production. In a symmetric equilibrium it must hold
that e pt =1 . This implies that (25) can be written in the form of a forward-looking Phillips curve
relationship:









2.7 Final Good Sector
The aggregate ﬁnal good Y is produced by perfectly competitive ﬁrms. It requires assembling a





















1−ϑ is the price index consistent with the ﬁnal good producers
earning zero proﬁts.
2.7.1 Final Goods Market Clearing
Equilibrium in the ﬁnal good market requires that the production of the ﬁnal good be allocated to
private consumption by households and entrepreneurs, investment, public spending, and to resource
costs that originate from the adjustment of prices as well as from the lender’s monitoring of the
investment activity:
Yt = Ct + Ce










Pt . Here Gt is government consumption of the ﬁnal good which evolves exogenously
a n di sa s s u m e dt ob eﬁnanced by means of lump sum taxes.
122.8 Monetary Policy
We assume that monetary policy is conducted by means of an interest rate reaction function,



























Notice that this general speciﬁcation allows for a reaction of the monetary policy instrument
to deviations of the real price of capital qt ≡
Qt
Pt from its eﬃcient value 1.
Our approach consists in assuming that the monetary authority can fully commit to the speciﬁ-
cation in (30) and then ﬁnding the policy speciﬁcation
©
φπ,φ y,φ q,φ r
ª
that maximizes household’s
welfare. In addition, we will be evaluating the relative welfare of a series of alternative simple
Taylor-type rules which impose alternative ad-hoc restrictions on (30).
3 Calibration and Solution Strategy
We employ a period utility function U(Ct,N t)=l o g ( Ct)+ν log(1 − Nt), with ν chosen in such a
way to generate a steady state level of employment N =0 .3. We set the discount factor β =0 .99,
so that the annual real interest rate is equal to 4%. The share of capital in the production function
α is 0.3, the quarterly depreciation rate δ is 0.025, the elasticity of substitution between varieties
is 6, which yields a steady state mark-up of 20%.The elasticity of the price of capital with respect
to investment output ratio ϕ is 0.5.
In line with the evidence reported in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) we set µ equal to 0.25. We
calibrate the steady state to imply an annual (average) external ﬁnance premium ψ =1 .02 (two
hundred basis points), and to generate an average bankruptcy rate of three percent (F(ω)=0 .03).
Log-productivity evolves as follows :
ln(At)=ρa lnAt−1 + εa
t
where the steady-state value A is normalized to unity and where εa
t is an iid shock with standard
deviation σa. In line with the real business cycle literature (see King and Rebelo, 1999). We set



















t is an iid shock with standard deviation σg. We follow the empirical evidence for the United
States in Perotti (2004) and set σg =0 .008 and ρg =0 .9.
Credit Frictions and Higher Order Approximation We solve the model by computing a
second order approximation of the policy functions around the non-stochastic steady state (with
positive average inﬂation, monopolistic distortions and monitoring costs). In the Appendix we
describe in more detail the form of the recursive equilibrium conditions.










This constraint has two features: (i) it is derived as equilibrium condition of an optimal contract;
(ii) it holds with equality in all periods, due to the endogenous behavior of the ﬁnance premium ψ
and of the cut-oﬀ value  . This is a fundamental diﬀerence between this framework and the credit
cycle model of Kyotaki and Moore (1997), and it bears important consequences for the application
of our solution method. In the model of Kyotaki and Moore, in fact, the borrowing constraint is
a typical collateral constraint on quantities. Namely, the borrower’s debt cannot exceed a certain
fraction of the collateral, with this fraction being exogenously determined. Noticeably, and unlike
equation (16) or (17), the same constraint is imposed to be binding in all periods. This friction
would be highly problematic in a context like ours in which stochastic uncertainty plays a key role
in the evaluation of the welfare performance of monetary policy.12 In fact, in that case, nothing
may rule out that in the presence of a favorable spell of positive shocks to entrepreneurs’ net worth
ab u ﬀer-stock behavior may dominate a behavior consistent with the collateral constraint holding
with equality. Hence accounting for the role of uncertainty in models with exogenous collateral
constraints on quantities would most likely require solution algorithms dealing with occasionally
binding constraints (see for instance Christiano and Fisher (2000)).
4 Steady-State and Equilibrium Dynamics
In Appendix A we describe the strategy employed for the computation of the steady state. Figure
1 shows the solution of the steady state of the KA model for a number of selected variables.
[Figure 1 about here]
12For instance, and among other things, this is a fundamental diﬀerence between our framework and the one
employed in Iacoviello (2004), who analyzes the eﬀects of monetary policy in terms of an inﬂation-output volatility
frontier in the context of a log-linearized model a la Kyotaki and Moore.
14The value of each variable is plotted against a choice of the monitoring cost parameter µ, i.e.,
the fraction of net output that the lender needs to employ for monitoring activity. It should be
noticed that a situation in which this fraction approaches zero corresponds to one in which credit
market imperfections are absent. The ﬁgure is representative of the distortion on the steady-state
level of capital and output induced by the existence of agency costs. Hence we see that larger
values of µ correspond to a larger steady-state external ﬁnance premium ψ. This raises the default
threshold ω, which in turn raises the entrepreneurs’ bankruptcy rate F(ω). As a consequence,
larger monitoring costs depress the average level of capital stock and output.
4.1 Responses to a Productivity Shock: Counter-cyclical Premium and Accel-
eration
Figure 2 reports, for the KA model, impulse responses of selected variables to a one percent positive
rise in total factor productivity for alternative values of µ (solid line µ =0 , dashed line µ =0 .25).
For illustrative purposes, we temporarily assume that monetary policy is conducted by means of a












[Figure 2 about here]
All numbers are in percent deviations from steady-state values. The ﬁgure is representative
of the acceleration eﬀect induced by the presence of credit frictions. Hence we see that a current
rise in productivity (which is accompanied also by a rise in expected future productivity given the
persistence in the innovation) triggers a rise in the asset price and investment. Crucially, net worth
responds quickly in the short run, driving the default threshold down (as well as the bankruptcy
rate). Notice that the quick response of the net worth depends on the ”credit cycle” eﬀect induced
by the movement in the asset price. Given that capital is ﬁxed in the short-run, the rise in the
asset price induces a more than proportional rise in net worth, which drives borrowing requirements
down. As a result, the cost of external ﬁnance falls on impact, reinforcing the eﬀect on net worth
and in turn on the asset price and investment. As it is clear, the countercyclical response of the
ﬁnance premium is stronger the larger the size of the monitoring imperfections.
What is important for our purposes is that, conditional on a positive rise in productivity, asset
price and ﬁnancial markup (the external ﬁnance premium) are negatively correlated. This is the
central feature of the acceleration model. Notice that this feature depends crucially on borrowing
frictions applying to the ﬁnancing of the entire stock of capital. This is the factor that makes
15the demand for borrowing procyclical. In fact, in equation (9), net worth NWt rises more than
proportionally relative to the term Qt Kt+1, thereby lowering the demand for borrowing
Notice also that credit frictions work in the direction of dampening the response of inﬂation to
the rise in technology. This is due to the fact that fostered capital accumulation with accelerated
investment triggers, for any given level of employment, a rise in the real marginal cost, which
tends to dampen the countercyclical response of inﬂation to technology shocks that is typical
of sticky price models with frictionless credit markets.13 As further explored below, this relative
”inﬂationary” eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions is crucial in determining the optimal response of monetary
policy in this context.
5 Welfare Evaluation
The critical feature of our analysis consists in the assessment of alternative interest rate rules based
on the evaluation of household’s welfare. Some observations on the computation of welfare in this
context are in order. First, one cannot safely rely on standard ﬁrst order approximation methods
to compare the relative welfare associated to each monetary policy arrangement. In fact, in an
economy like ours, in which distortions exert an eﬀect both in the short-run and in the steady
state, stochastic volatility aﬀects both ﬁrst and second moments of those variables that are critical
for welfare. Since in a ﬁrst order approximation of the model’s solution the expected value of a
variable coincides with its non-stochastic steady state, the eﬀects of volatility on the variables’
mean values is by construction neglected. Hence policy arrangements can be correctly ranked only
by resorting to a higher order approximation of the policy functions.14
This last observation also suggests that our welfare metric needs to be correctly chosen. In
particular, one needs to focus on the conditional expected discounted utility of the representative
agent. This is necessary exactly to take into account of transitional eﬀects from the deterministic
to the diﬀerent stochastic steady states respectively implied by each alternative policy rule.
A third observation concerns our representation of policy. It is clear that the optimal choice of
©
φπ,φ y,φ q,φ r
ª
delivers the welfare-maximizing policy within the constrained class of linear interest
rate rules speciﬁed in (30). Alternatively, it would only be the solution to the full Ramsey planner
problem (under commitment) to yield a representation of the globally optimal allocation. However,
the speciﬁcation and solution of the Ramsey problem in the presence, as here, of a relatively large
number of state variables involves a series of non trivial technical problems. In addition, and more
13For instance, see Gali et al. (2003), Ireland (2003).
14See Kim and Kim (2003) for an analysis of the inaccuracy of welfare calculations based on log-linear approxima-
tions in dynamic open economies. See Kim et al. (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) for a more general
discussion.
16importantly, the formulation of policy in terms optimal (simple) interest rate rules has attracted
considerable attention for its ability of striking a sound balance between the rigor of a choice-
theoretic evaluation of policy (as opposed to ad-hoc loss functions) and the requirement that the
same normative formulation of policy be easily implementable.
Finally it is important to recall that our framework features heterogeneity of consumers. How-
ever, entrepreneurs are risk-neutral agents. This implies that their mean level of consumption is
unaﬀected by the sources of stochastic volatility. Hence, alternative interest rate rules not only will
imply the same (deterministic) steady-state level of all variables, but they will also imply the same
stochastic mean consumption for entrepreneurs. As a matter of fact, and as already noticed by
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2004), a model economy which features the type of credit frictions
embedded here can be easily reduced (via an equivalence argument) to a simple representative
agent economy with a variable tax on investment (which, in the context of the KA model, would
correspond to the external ﬁnance premium). This implies that a measure accounting for both
workers’ and entrepreneurs’ welfare, need simply to be amended by adding the (conditional) mean

















where ξ is the weight assigned to workers’ utility. However, as emphasized in Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1998), the fraction of entrepreneurial consumption over aggregate consumption can
be reasonably assumed to be negligible. Under the assumption that the entrepreneurial share of
consumption is negligible (i.e., ξ → 1) we can rely on a synthetic welfare measure which is given by
the fraction Ω of household’s consumption that would be needed to equate conditional welfare W0
under a generic interest rate policy to the level of welfare f W0 implied by the optimal rule. Hence





βtU((1 + Ω)Ct,N t)
)
= f W0
Under our speciﬁcation of utility one can solve for Ω and obtain:
Ω =e x p
n³





15Convexiﬁcation procedures have been commonly used also in the optimal taxation literature which studies the
optimal allocation of taxes across heterogenous agents. See Judd (1998).
175.1 Responding to Asset Prices
We ﬁrst simulate the KA economy under the two sources of aggregate uncertainty, productivity and
government consumption shocks. We conduct two types of experiments. First, we compute welfare
under diﬀerent (ad hoc) speciﬁcations of the monetary policy rule. The rules are the following: (i)
Strict Inﬂation Targeting;( i i )Asset Price Targeting; (iii) Simple Taylor rule,w i t hφπ =1 .5a n d
φy = φq = φr =0 ;( i v )Taylor rule + asset prices,w i t hφπ =1 .5, φq =0 .5, φy =0 ;( v )Taylor
rule + Finance Premium, with φπ =1 .5, φψ =0 .5, φy =0a n dw h e r eφψ is a coeﬃcient involving
ar e s p o n s et ot h eﬁnance premium rather than the asset price (see below for further comments).
Furthermore rules (iii)-(v) are evaluated with and without interest rate smoothing (φr =0a n d
φr =0 .9 respectively).16 Second, we search in the grid of parameters
©
φπ,φ y,φ q,φ r
ª
for the rule
which delivers the highest level of welfare, which we deﬁne as the optimal policy rule.17
The choice of evaluating strict asset price stabilization (rule (ii)) is motivated by the recent
debate on the potential role of asset price targeting as accelerator of the Great Depression.18
Hence it seems of particular interest to evaluate the relative welfare performance of asset price
versus nominal price stabilization.
Table 1 summarizes our main ﬁndings. The values of the policy parameters that are found
to maximize conditional welfare, as well as the welfare loss Ω (relative to the optimal policy) of
alternative simple rules are reported.
[Table 1 about here]
Several aspects are worth emphasizing. First, among the simple rules analyzed above strict
stabilization of inﬂation is the optimal rule. Second, strict asset price stabilization is clearly welfare
detrimental, and features the worst performance in the family of rules considered. Third, positive
interest rate smoothing is part of the optimal policy rule. In general, it also substantially improves
the welfare performance of all the simple rules considered here.
To further investigate whether the response to asset prices in a Taylor rule signals an inde-
pendent welfare eﬀect, Figures 3 and 4 report the eﬀects on conditional welfare of varying both the
16For the sake of simplicity we do not report the results in the case of a positive response to output. In fact, and
across rules, a reaction to output is strongly welfare detrimental. This result is consistent with the one obtained by
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) in a model economy with capital accumulation, no adjustment cost and frictionless
credit markets. This welfare loss is mainly due to the fact that we pick the ”wrong” target. Since optimal monetary
policy conduct aims at reducing ineﬃcient output variations, the right target is likely to be the deviation of output
from potential rather than output itself. More speciﬁcally, in our case potential output would correspond to the
constrained Pareto optimum, namely the solution achieved by the Ramsey planner.
17We search over the following ranges: [0,4] for φπ, [0,2] for φq,[ 0 ,1] for φy. We then compare rules with interest
rate smoothing (φr =0 .9) to rules without smoothing (φr =0 ) . We judged as admissible a combination of policy
parameters that delivered a unique rational expectations equilibrium.
18See for instance Bernanke (2002).
18inﬂation and the asset price coeﬃcients on the monetary policy rule, respectively without and with
interest rate smoothing.
[Figure 3 and 4 about here ]
The main message that emerges in both pictures is that if there exists a positive (although
minor) eﬀect on welfare from responding to asset prices this happens to be the case only for low
values of the response to inﬂation (and in particular in the presence of interest rate smoothing).
In general, optimal policy prescribes a strong anti-inﬂationary stance.T h u s ,f o rl o wv a l u e so fφπ,
responding to asset prices is a way to implement a ”leaning against the wind” policy that allows
to complement the only partial inﬂation targeting response. When monetary policy turns strongly
anti-inﬂationary, the scope for responding to asset prices disappears. As we see, at high levels of
φπ the welfare function becomes completely ﬂat in φπ.
5.1.1 Targeting the Financial Markup
Our results so far point to a minimal role for asset prices in an optimal setting of interest rate
rules. A rule featuring a very strong reaction to inﬂation seems to replicate closely the welfare
performance of the (constrained) optimal rule.
However, there is room to argue that a monetary authority concerned with maximizing the
welfare of the representative consumer may wish to engineer a response to indicators that more
directly signal the cyclical evolution of ﬁnancial frictions in the economy. In this respect, it seems
natural to explore the eﬀects of rules which include the external ﬁnance premium directly as an
independent argument. Hence we search for the optimal combination of
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where ψ>1 is the steady-state level of the ﬁnance premium.
Figures 5 and 6 report the eﬀects on conditional welfare of varying both the inﬂation and the
ﬁnance premium coeﬃcients on the monetary policy rule speciﬁed as in (34), respectively without
and with interest rate smoothing.
19[Figure 5 and 6 about here]
Notice that in this case we let the premium parameter φψ vary in the range [−1,1]. The
message emerging from Table 1 and Figures 5 and 6 is twofold. On the one hand, responding to the
ﬁnance premium in addition to inﬂation seems to improve the welfare performance of simple Taylor
rules better than responding to asset prices. This is especially evident from inspecting Figures 6.
Thus we see that, although minor, welfare gains from responding to the ﬁnance premium persist
even when the inﬂation coeﬃcient is high and in the order of φπ = 3. On the other hand, as a
general principle, the results in Table 1 conﬁrm that a strict stabilization of inﬂation continues to
dominate a hybrid rule featuring a response to both inﬂation and ﬁnance premium.
5.1.2 Why Price Stability?
The general message of the KA model is that, regardless of whether the monetary authority re-
sponds to movements in asset prices or in the external ﬁnance premium (in addition to inﬂation),
optimal policy does not deviate from the strict inﬂation targeting prescription. The intuition for
this result lies in a typical public ﬁnance argument. In a nutshell, there is no inherent trade-oﬀ for
the monetary authority in managing the two distortions that characterize the equilibrium dynamics
in this context: sticky goods prices, which generate ﬂuctuations in price markups, and credit fric-
tions, which generate acceleration in asset prices and ﬂuctuations in the ﬁnancial markup (ﬁnance
premium). To gain an intuition, consider a scenario with technology shocks, which are the chief
source of variability in this context. A positive rise in productivity causes a fall in the ﬁnance
premium and an (over)acceleration in investment. Ceteris paribus, this calls for a rise in real in-
terest rates to stabilize the ﬁnance premium. On the other hand, and relative to scenario in which
credit frictions are absent, the rise in productivity also causes a rise in inﬂation (despite inﬂation
generally falling below steady state, see Figure 2). Hence, at the margin, monetary authority’s pre-
ferred response is a rise in real interest rates to contract demand and minimize ﬂuctuations in price
markups. As emphasized earlier, the key point is that ﬁnancial frictions operate in the direction
of dampening the (negative) response of inﬂation to productivity shocks relative to a situation in
which the same frictions are absent.
6 The Investment-Propagation Model
At the heart of the KA model illustrated above lies a typical ﬁnancial acceleration eﬀect. Its
dynamics are mainly driven by a countercyclical behavior of the ﬁnancial markup and by a negative
correlation between the latter and the asset price. However, these elements need not necessarily
be a feature of any model embedding credit market frictions. Below we illustrate a theoretical
20framework, still based on the presence of endogenous agency costs, in which these central mechanics
are reversed. In this model, asset price movements are genuinely a symptom of ﬁnancial frictions,
in the sense that the relative price of investment goods is determined by the interaction of demand
and supply in a lending market characterized by a moral hazard problem. Hence, here, reacting to
asset prices may bear a more solid public ﬁnance argument for monetary policy, for its cyclicality
is strictly motivated by the presence of ﬁnancial imperfections (as opposed to the KA model in
which a necessary condition for the endogeneity of asset prices is the presence of adjustment costs
on capital). In this environment, that we henceforth label Investment-Propagation (IP) model,
asset prices and ﬁnance premium (ﬁnancial markup) are positively correlated (while the opposite
is true in the KA model). Hence it is of particular interest to understand whether the strong anti-
inﬂationary prescription that emerges from the KA model survives in a credit frictions environment
in which the ﬁnancial markup is procyclical.
The IP model presented below is a sticky-price monetary extension of Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997). Below, we illustrate only the essential features that diﬀerentiate it from the KA model.
6.1 Households
There is continuum of households in this economy with measure 1, with utility function as in
(1). Households derive income from renting labor and capital to intermediate goods ﬁrms (whose
prices are sticky), and from receiving proﬁts of the same monopolistic ﬁrms. They use their
income to purchase two types of goods: consumption (ﬁnal) goods Ct and investment goods It
from the entrepreneurs. Investment goods are originally consumption goods transformed via the
entrepreneurial activity to be described later. The household’s sequence of budget constraints
reads:
PtCt + QtIt + Dt+1 ≤ (1 + Rn
t )Dt + WtNt + ZtKh
t + Υt + Tt (35)
where Kh
t is capital held by households. The purchase of investment goods contributes to capital
accumulation as follows19:
Kh
t+1 =( 1− δ)Kh
t + It (36)
Let’s deﬁne by qt ≡
Qt
Pt the relative price of investment goods and zt ≡ Zt
Pt the real rental rate
of capital. Eﬃciency conditions require:
19Notice that we do not model adjustment costs on capital. In fact, this version of the model can be thought of as
one in which adjustment costs on capital (and asset prices as a result) are endogenous.




















Equations (37) and (38) are standard conditions on bonds investment and labor supply. Equa-
tion (39) is an intertemporal investment demand condition. The essence of the IP model consists
in building a theory for the endogenous cyclical behavior of qt based on capital market frictions,
going beyond the mere existence of adjustment costs on capital.
6.2 Entrepreneurs
The second set of agents in the economy, of measure η, are the entrepreneurs. Their activity consists
in purchasing consumption goods and transform them into investment goods via an instantaneous
risky technology. To purchase ﬁnal goods they employ internal resources, but need also to acquire a
ﬁnancial loan. As in the KA model, the structure of the ﬁnancial contract requires the entrepreneurs











Notice that the entrepreneurs have a lower discount rate than households, an assumption which
insures that the entrepreneurs never hold enough wealth to overcome the ﬁnancing constraints.20
Entrepreneurs earn income from renting the capital stock to intermediate ﬁrms, with Ke
t being
entrepreneurial capital. Hence their nominal net worth can be written:21
NWt =[ Zt + Qt(1 − δ)]Ke
t
Each entrepreneur purchases ﬁnal goods for the nominal amount PtIt and invest in a risky tech-
nology that produces ωtIt units of capital goods within the same period.22 He/she must borrow a
nominal amount PtIt −NWt, and agrees to repay (1+Rn
t ) per nominal unit borrowed. Hence, for
20We employ this strategy here to maintain similarity with the framework in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). The
alternative assumption, employed in the KA model illustrated above, simply requires that the entrepreneurs be
rule-of-thumb consumers who survive with probability θ and consume their end-of-period capital income.
21We abstract here from modelling entrpreneurial labor supply.
22As in the KA model loan contracts are just one-periods contracts.
22a non-defaulting entrepreneur the realization of ωt must be such that ωt > ωt, where the latter is
the default threshold which, in analogy with equation (10), must satisfy:
ωt =
(1 + Rn
t )(PtIt − NWt)
Pt It
(41)




t = QtIt(ωt − ωt) (42)












t ≡ (1 + Rn
t )qt
is the premium on external funds. Below we show how this premium is related to the aggregate
ﬁnancial conditions and to the default threshold via the speciﬁcation of the optimal contract on
investment.
6.3 Financial Contract on Investment
The structure of the contract is similar to the one in the KA model. The crucial diﬀerence is that,
for each entrepreneur, the contract speciﬁes an investment amount It along with a threshold value
 t that solve the following maximization problem23:
Max (1 − Γ( t)) QtIt (44)
subject to the lender’s participation constraint:
QtIt [Γ( t) − µM( t)] ≥ Lt (45)
Eﬃciency requires that (45) holds with equality. It is show that the solution to the problem
above, taking advantage of linear aggregation as in the KA model, implies the following two ﬁrst
order conditions:
23We omit for simplicity to specify the contract in idiosyncratic terms j. W ea l r e a d yk n o wf r o mt h eK Am o d e l
how aggregation is easily imp l e m e n t e di nt h i sc o n t e x t .
23It =
nwt
1 − qt [Γ( t) − µM( t)]
(46)
qt = ρ( t) (47)
where nwt ≡ NWt
Pt ,a n dρ( t) coincides with (15). Equation (46) is a crucial condition in this
context. It expresses the supply of capital as a function of the relative price of the investment
goods qt and of the (aggregate) ﬁnancial conditions proxied by the level of net worth nwt.N o t i c e
that in the space (qt,I t) movements in net worth have the eﬀect of shifting the investment supply
schedule, in turn aﬀecting the relative price of investment goods. This is the feature that genuinely
signals the presence of monitoring imperfections in the lender-borrower relationship.





[Γ( t) − µM( t)]
≡ ψI( t)
Notice that, since monitoring costs increase with  t,i tm u s tb et h a tψI
0
(•) > 0. In other
words, and intuitively, a rise in the default threshold triggers a rise in the external ﬁnance premium.
6.3.1 Calibration
To calibrate and solve the IP model we follow the same strategy employed for the KA model. A
relevant parameter that characterizes the IP model uniquely is the entrepreneurs’ discount rate γ,
which we calibrate in order to obtain a steady-state ﬁnance premium ψI =1 .02. Notice that in the
steady-state of the IP model the presence of non-zero monitoring costs(µ>0) implies that relative
price of capital exceeds one (q>1).
6.4 Dynamics in the IP model: Pro-Cyclical Finance Premium
To illustrate the dynamics of the IP model Figure 7 reports impulse responses of selected variables
to a positive productivity shock. The solid and the dashed line signal the response conditional on
a value of µ =0a n dµ =0 .25 respectively. All numbers are in percent deviations from steady-
state values. This illustrative exercise is again conducted under the temporary assumption that
monetary policy is conducted via a simple Taylor rule as in (32).
[Figure 7 about here]
24The critical element to notice is that in this case the rise in investment coupled with the rise
in the asset price is paralleled by a slow response in net worth. In fact, in the short-run, net worth
is mostly composed of entrepreneurial capital, and its dynamic is sluggish. The net result is an
initial rise in borrowing needs (i.e., qtIt rises relatively more than nwt ) and in the marginal cost
of investment. In turn, this generates a rise in the default threshold  t.F o rt h eﬁnance premium
is an increasing function of  t, the result is a rise in the external ﬁnance premium.H o w e v e r ,o v e r
time, net worth accumulates, and its response shifts the investment supply schedule outwards and
to such an extent that the asset price starts to revert downward. It is this delayed response of net
worth that induces a subsequent boost to investment, thereby generating the observed hump-shaped
dynamics.
Interestingly, and somewhat in contrast with the KA model, the reactivity of net worth is
inversely proportional to the degree of ﬁnancial frictions summarized by µ. Hence, in this frame-
work, ﬁnancial frictions are synonymous with persistence rather than acceleration. Even more
subtly, and as emphasized in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998), acceleration and persistence seems to
be related by a trade-oﬀ. It is important to notice that what critically distinguishes the IP model
from the KA model is the comovement between qt and the ﬁnance premium ψt.S i n c e b o t h a r e
positively correlated with  t, the cyclical response of the default threshold is critical in driving
their mutual correlation. In turn, what drives the movement of the default threshold is the demand
for borrowing, which responds procyclically in this context. As a result, the default threshold rises
and the ﬁnance premium is procyclical and positively correlated with the asset price.
6.5 Welfare and Robustness of Price Stability
Table 1 (bottom panel) reports the welfare evaluation of the same simple rules analyzed in the
upper panel in the context of the KA model. Hence we see that also in the context of the IP
model inﬂation targeting emerges as the optimal rule. This is conﬁrmed by the grid-search analysis
p r e s e n t e di nF i g u r e8a n d9 .
[Figure 8 and 9 about here]
Even more strikingly, and already at low levels of the inﬂation response φπ (consistent with
a baseline Taylor rule), responding to asset prices is welfare detrimental. Notice that, for the sake
of exposition, we do not report the results of rules that respond to the ﬁnance premium. In fact,
in the IP model, and due to the strict correlation between asset price and ﬁnance premium, a rule
that features a response to the ﬁnance premium performs virtually the same as a rule that implies
a response to the asset price.
25We believe that the robustness of inﬂation targeting as optimal policy within the IP model is a
particularly interesting result. In fact, a priori, and due to the procyclicality of the ﬁnance premium,
this model would have suggested a potential tension between the goals of ﬁnancial and price markup
stabilization. Our reasoning proceeds as follows. Recall that in response to a productivity shock,
and as illustrated in Figure 7, the IP model generates a procyclical response of the ﬁnancial markup.
Ceteris paribus, and in the short run, this implies that investment falls below its level that would
prevail in the absence of credit frictions. In other words, this model generates a procyclical tax
on investment. Hence, along this margin, the desired policy response would require a fall in the
real interest rate. The crucial issue is whether this goal is consistent with the one of price markup
stabilization. Hence we see from Figure 7 that, on impact, inﬂation falls below steady state (dashed
line). More importantly, it also lies persistently below the level that would prevail in the absence of
credit frictions (solid line). Hence, like in the KA model and relative to a benchmark in which credit
markets are frictionless, credit frictions operate here in the direction of dampening the response of
inﬂation to technology shocks. In turn, this calls for lowering the real interest rate below its natural
level. This fall in the real rate can accommodate both the ﬁnancial markup stabilization motive
and the price markup stabilization motive. Interestingly, while neither the KA model nor the IP
model seem to generate a policy trade-oﬀ, the required behavior of the real interest rate (relative
to the credit-frictionless level) is diﬀerent in the two cases.
7 Conclusions
We have analyzed optimal interest rules in the context of two general equilibrium models featuring
sticky prices, endogenous agency costs and asset prices. In the ﬁrst model, credit frictions apply
to the ﬁnancing of physical capital, while in the second model to the ﬁnancing of the investment
ﬂow. Although the two frameworks deliver opposite predictions concerning the cyclical movement
of the ”ﬁnancial markup”, we ﬁnd that strict inﬂation stabilization is a robust optimal monetary
policy prescription. The intuition lies in the fact that while the two models generate quite diﬀerent
dynamics of inﬂation and investment, in both of them credit frictions work in the direction of
dampening the cyclical behavior of inﬂation relative to a hypothetical scenario in which the same
frictions are removed. If, in response to a positive productivity shock, credit frictions generate
acceleration and over-investment (as in the KA model) we ﬁnd that inﬂation remains above its
level in the absence of credit frictions. On the other hand, if credit frictions generate hump-shaped
dynamics and keep investment below its frictionless level in the short-run (as in the IP model), we
o b s e r v et h a ti n ﬂation remains below its level in the absence of credit frictions. In both cases, a
manipulation of the real interest rate is consistent with the two public ﬁnance motives that drive the
26welfare analysis in this context: stabilization of the price markup and stabilization of the ﬁnancial
markup.
An important caveat of our analysis concerns the characteristics of the contracting problem
featured in our economy. To formalize the relationship between lender and borrower we employ a
costly state veriﬁcation contract in which the cost of loans is indexed to future expected inﬂation.
This implies that the real version of the external ﬁnance premium is independent of future expected
inﬂation. Hence the monetary authority endowed with a single instrument - i.e., the nominal interest
rate - cannot have a direct leverage on the ﬁnancial distortion. We conjecture that if non-indexed
contracts were in place, which implies a direct dependence of the external ﬁnance premium on
expected inﬂation, the monetary authority would have a stronger incentive to inﬂate the economy.
Surprise inﬂation would indeed increase the value of nominal net worth, thereby reducing the ex-
p o s tv a l u eo fr e a ld e b ta n dt h ec o s to ft h el o a n .T h i sa r g u m e n t ,w h i c hi si nl i n ew i t ht h eF i s h e r i a n
theory of debt deﬂation, might call for sizeable deviations of optimal monetary policy from the
price stability target. We are currently investigating these issues in ongoing parallel work.
27A Equilibrium






Pt , nwt ≡ NWt
Pt ,z t ≡ Zt
Pt. For given processes
{At, Gt}
∞
t=0 a recursive (imperfectly) competitive equilibrium in the KA model is a sequence of
allocations for Ct, (1 + Rn
t ),π t, mct,N t,q t,I t, (1 + Rk
t+1),z t,C e
t,  t,y k
t ,n w t, Kt+1 which solves
the following system of equations:
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28IP model For given processes {At, Gt}
∞
t=0, a recursive (imperfectly) competitive equilibrium
in the IP model is a sequence of allocations for Ct, (1+Rn







t+1 which solves the following system of equations:
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t = zt + qt (1 − δ) (66)
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + ηIt(1 − µM( t)) (67)
AtF(.)=( 1− η)Ct + ηCe










(1 − Γ( t+1))(Γ
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1 − Γ( t)
1 − qt(Γ( t) − µM( t))
To complete the description of the equilibrium one should add equations (49), (50), (54), (59).
B Computation of the Deterministic Steady State in the KA model
A critical step for the solution of the steady state in the KA model involves the computation of the






θ(1 − Γ(ω))ρ(ω)β−1¤−1 ≡ κ(ω) (70)




= {1 − ρ(ω)[Γ(ω) − µM(ω)]}
−1 ≡ e κ(ω) (71)
Individual and aggregate capital-net worth ratios must be equalized in equilibrium. Equating (70)
and (71) one obtains a non-linear equation which can be solved for the single unknown ω.T h i si n
turn yields a value for steady-state ﬁnance premium ψ:
ψ =
Ã
(1 − Γ( )) (Γ
0





+( Γ( ) − µM( ))
!−1
> 1 (72)
The real rental cost of capital z is given by:
z =( 1+rr)ψ − 1+δ
where rr ≡ β−1 is the gross real rate of interest. Hence a higher ﬁnance premium, by lowering the
























The real return on capital is given by
(1 + Rk)=π(z +1− δ) (75)





where π>1 is the average gross rate of inﬂation.
Using (73) and the fact that, in the absence of steady-state investment adjustment costs,
I













where g ≡ G
Y and Ce
K is given by (20).
With preferences U(C, N)=l o g ( C)+ν log(1+N) one can use (4), (73) and (77) to compute




















Computation of the remaining elements of the vector of endogenous variables follows in a straight-
forward manner.
C Solution of the Model
The set of optimality conditions of the optimal plan can be described as follows:
Et {H (Ψt+1,Ψt,X t+1,X t)} = 0 (79)
where Et denotes the mathematical expectations operator, conditional on information available at
time t, Ψt is the vector of endogenous non-predetermined variables, and Xt ≡ [x1,t,x 2,t]i st h es t a t e
vector. Here x1,t denotes the vector of endogenous predetermined variables, while x2,t is the vector
of exogenous variables which follows a stochastic process:
x2,t+1 = zx2,t + ηξε t+1,ε t ∼ i.i.d.N(0,Σ) (80)
where the scalars ξ and η are known parameters. The solution of the model is of the form (Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004a)):




Equation (81) and (82) describe the policy function and the transition function respectively. We
compute a second order expansion of the functions g(Xt,ξ)a n dh(Xt,ξ) around the deterministic
steady-state. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) show that, up to a second order, the coeﬃcients
of the policy functions attached to terms that are linear in the state vector Xt are independent
of the size of the volatility of the shock(s). To evaluate numerically the ﬁrst and second order
31derivatives of the policy functions we employ the Matlab codes compiled by Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe, available at the website http://www.econ.duke.edu/˜grohe. The second order expansion of
g and h is required for an accurate evaluation of the value of the variable W0 in the stochastic
steady state .
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35Table 1. Welfare Performance of Alternative Monetary Policy Rules
           KA Model
                    Rule % Loss relative to Optimal Welfare 
Strict Inflation Targeting 0.000 -200.796
Asset Price Targeting 0.672 -201.465
Taylor rule  0.040 -200.836
              -with smoothing 0.001 -200.796
Taylor rule + asset price 0.044 -200.839
              -with smoothing 0.003 -200.799
Taylor rule + Finance Premium 0.017 -200.812
              -with smoothing 0.001 -200.796
          IP Model
                    Rule % Loss relative to Optimal Welfare 
Strict Inflation Targeting 0.000 -78.782
Asset Price Targeting 1.662 -80.430
Taylor rule  0.026 -78.808
              -with smoothing 0.011 -78.793
Taylor rule + asset price 0.051 -78.833
              -with smoothing 0.014 -78.796
Taylor rule + Finance Premium 0.042 -78.824
              -with smoothing 0.013 -78.795
Notes:  Welfare Loss is the % fraction of consumption required  to equate welfare under any given policy rule to 














































Figure 1: Steady-state Eﬀects of Varying Monitoring Costs

























































Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock, without (solid) and with (dashed)
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Figure 6: Eﬀect on Welfare of Varying the Response to Inﬂation and Finance Premium
(KA model, smoothing)

























































Figure 7: Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock, without (solid) and with (dashed)
















































































Figure 9: Eﬀect on Welfare of Varying the Response to Inﬂation and Asset Price (IP
model, smoothing)
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